Abstract-An important component of a programming language for writing operating systems, or other large parallel systems, is the set of access control facilities. Two principles for access control, expressive power and access validation, are discussed. Then two new language mechanisms are presented: one for expressing the static structure and access rights of parallel systems, the other for controlling dynamic access to shared objects (monitors). The use of the proposed mechanisms is illustrated by examples including a file system. Finally, the relationships between the mechanisms, access validation, and the safety problem are discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION IN AN EFFORT to both increase the reliability and correctness of concurrent systems and decrease the cost of their design and implementation, many people have been working on the development of parallel programming languages [2] , [4] , [ 121. The initial focus has justifiably been upon the central problem of all concurrent systems; namely, processes and their interaction. A second important problem is access control. If we are to develop reliable and secure software, it is important that each module only have access to exactly those objects it requires. This leads to the need for language facilities to specify static (pennanent) and dynamic (temporary) access rights. This paper proposes two flexible yet simple language features: a gant declaration for expressing the static structure and permanent access rights of a system of parallel processes, and capability variables for controlling dynamic access to shared objects (monitors).
In the remainder of the paper, we present our proposals in detail, illustrate their use, compare them to other approaches, and discuss their relation to access security. Before proceeding, however, we discuss the two principles, expressive power and access validation, that guided their development and against which they or any access control facilities should be evaluated. Because access control is of greatest concern in parallel systems, for the purposes of illustration we use Pascal [11] augmented by processes and monitors [4] as the language to II. PRINCIPLES A programming language provides a set of mechanisms for implementing systems. Using the mechanisms, one implements algorithms and organizations that enforce policies. In our opinion, access control mechanisms should adhere to two principles: 1 ) expressive power-they should allow a wide variety of access policies to be expressed clearly and exactly;
2) access validation-they should allow the implementation of an access policy to be validated.
Two types of access control mechanisms, static and dynamic, occur in parallel systems. The purpose of static mechanisms is to increase reliability and reduce unwanted interference by controlling the objects that each subject sees. In terms of processes and monitors, this means that each process should only have access to those monitors that it needs to perform its intended task. In a dynamic system, such as a file system, objects come and go; consequently, access paths come and go. The purpose of dynamic access control mechanisms is to allow these changes to be represented and efficiently implemented.
An expressive set of access control mechanisms should make it possible to describe clearly a variety of access policies. In particular, it should be possible to : 1) limit each subject to those objects and operations that it needs, 2) insure that only meaningful and authorized operations are applied to objects, and 3) control the order and timing of access to controlled objects.
The first two points have been called "access correctness" by Jones and Liskov [5] . To this we have added a third criterium to capture the fact that an access policy for dynamic objects is often concemed with the timing of access. Examples of such policies are: access must be scheduled before it occurs; allocation must precede access; and access cannot occur after an object has been released.
As an illustration of these points, Fig. 1 presents the abstract structure of five common situations in parallel systems. Fig.  l(a) shows the structure when several processes share an object such as a device or message channel. Possible access policies in this case are restricting use of the shared object to a subset of system processes and, possibly, restricting each process to a subset of the operations on the object. For specific channel. Fig. 1(b) shows a message channel that is implemented by a queue of buffers acquired from a common pool. A policy here may be that processes cannot directly access the buffer pool, only message channels can. This is one example of a multilevel interaction. Another example, device scheduling, is shown in Fig. l(c) . Here the policy might be that all processes must go through the scheduler in order to access the shared object. The first three structures of Fig. 1 are static in nature; the next two are dynamic. In Fig. 1(d) , an allocator controls access to a shared object. Processes request access from the allocator; when their request is granted, they receive a dynamic access right that enables them to directly (hence efficiently) access the object. Examples of access policies in this case are that an object must be requested before it can be accessed, that once requested it can be accessed directly, and that once released it can no longer be accessed. In Fig. 1(e) , a file system is modeled. A process may potentially have access to many files at once. The access policy may be that a process can be restricted to a subset of the file operations, that the creator of a file controls all access to it (via the file manager perhaps), and that shared access can be revoked at any time by the owner of the file.
An expressive set of access control mechanisms should allow any or all of the above access policies to be implemented by a system programmer. This is our first guiding principle. A systems' users, however, are concerned with adequate enforcement of a specific set of stated policies. In particular, it is desirable to validate the correctness of an implementation of the stated policies. This is our second guiding principle.
In order to validate an implementation, it is first necessary to solve the access safety problem. As defined in [3] , the safety problem is concerned with deciding whether a given protection system can lead to a "leak." Here we will take a more global view and define access safety to be the problem of determining the potential access rights of every subject (process) for every object (process, monitor, variable, etc. define a set of monitors for controlling remote terminal I/O. Users should be allowed to access the instances defined by the operating system, but they should be prevented from defining any new instances. (In general, an operating system wants to limit the number of instances of objects that it defmes such as buffers and files.) The purpose of a type declaration is to define a new collection of objects. The "operation" on a tye declaration is, therefore, creating (declaring) an instance. Viewed in this way, a block can only create an instance of a t if it either declares or has been granted the p name.
A block may refer to any type name that it knows, however, for example in a formal parameter declaration. These concepts are illustrated in Fig. 3 for the terminal I/O problem Since no grants are applied to E Terminal, the users cannot declare new terminals that are unknown to System. On the other hand, the grants applied to Termi and Term2 permit the users to access the terminal instances defined by System, and User2 can write a procedure accepting a Terminal (actually Term2) as a parameter. Note that procedure Dowrite cannot access Term2 directly since it has not been granted Term2; Dowrite can only reference T, which is bound to Term2 by User2. If User2 had granted Term2 to Dowrite, no parameter to the procedure would be required. The key point is that either access policy can be readily expressed.
C Comparison with Other Approaches
Two approaches for handling similar problems in parallel programs have already been discussed in the literature. Concurrent Pascal [2] allows each subject to access directly only those objects it declares. Parameter passing is used at initialization to specify the interconnections of subjects (this allows any kind of object, specifically monitors and processes, to be Although we have only illustrated the use of capabilities with monitors, they can also be used with processes in an analogous way; the rights would then authorize whatever process operations, such as activate, the language supports. With capabilities for both processes and monitors, we could easily describe a spooling system such as the one programmed in Concurrent Pascal in [2] . We have, in fact, added process and module capabilities to Modula [12] in order to program (on paper) a large system based on and providing the user services of Unix [9] . In Two other language facilities that permit dynamic allocation of objects have been proposed. Silberschatz et al. [6] introduced the manager construct, which is actually a new type of monitor with special internal primitives. This feature is very high level, and, as a result, puts policy decisions in the language. For example, only the manager for some object type may alter any process' access rights for instances. Recently, the manager concept has been extended to incorporate capabilities for managed resources [6] . We, however, allow capabilities to be manipulated (in carefully controlled ways) and it is this power that enables us to program the file system shown in Fig. 5 . Our approach is also applicable to objects other than monitors. We feel that our proposals are less complicated, more general, and easier to understand and use.
The other proposal, by Jones and Liskov [5] , is similar in nature to ours. All access to dynamically controlled objects is through capability-like variables; but in their case, each variable has its access rights (qualified type) set at declaration. Hence all use and movement of rights (via assignment or parameter passing) can be checked at compile-time to insure access correctness. One drawback of their approach is that if many different sets of access rights are needed for some object, at least one new capability must be defined for each set. In particular, they state in [5] that their static mechanism cannot be used to build a file system. Our mechanism, on the other hand, requires (minimal) run-time checking. In our opinion both approaches are viable; the main difference is that Jones and Liskov focus on sequential, object oriented languages (e.g., CLU and Alphard), whereas we focus on parallelism and dynamic control.
V. ACCESS SECURITY As argued in Section II, true protection requires validating a system's access policy. This in tum requires 1) that the policy be stated precisely and 2) that system modules that manipulate or use capabilities be validated with respect to the policy. The key to validation is to solve the safety problem described by Harrison, Ruzzo, and Uliman in [3] .
A. The Safety Problem
The safety problem is normally formulated in terms of leaking access rights to untrustworthy subjects. A protection system can be described in terms of subjects, objects, generic rights, protection commands, and protection states. An invocation of a protection command can create a new subject, create a new object, or change some subject's access rights for an object, thus altering the current protection state. Such a change is defined to be safe only if the newly acquired rights cannot be used in conjunction with the protection commands to give away access rights at any time in the future. If we can decide safety for every invocation of a protection command within a specific system, then we have solved the safety problem for that system. The heart of this question is deciding what each subject could do in the future.
The safety problem has a fairly natural mapping into a programming environment. A language defines a class of protection systems; each program is a specific instance. The subjects are the program units that define the various execution environments-in our case each process, procedure, or monitor block constitutes a different subject. The 2) Given the initial state, model the use of capability variables to see if the maximum potential access of each subject is safe.
3) Monitor the use of protection commands at run-time and disallow any command that causes an unauthorized leak. 4) Formally prove that all use of capability variables adheres to the desired access policy.
The first method is the one described in [3] . Assuming that every protection command might be executed, all possible protection states are considered. There is, however, no general algorithm to compute all possible states and solve the safety problem in this way [3] . The problem is that program code, which restricts the set of possible states, is ignored. For example, even if one process could pass an access right to another, it will not happen if the process' code contains no capability assignment statements or procedure calls.
The second method is to compute the potential access rights of each subject. This can be done by first computing the direct access rights (those a subject has without first changing environments) and then computing full access rights (direct plus those resulting from procedure calls). Direct access rights in our language can only be acquired in three ways: by the default scope rule, statistically via grant, or dynamically via capa- 
